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Archive for March, 2011

The problems that arise for Saussure’s contemporary version of communication processes do not seem to arise for Wittgenstein. Saussure divided communication into three categories, the signifier, signified and combination of the two, the sign. The signifiers and the signified can be defined by what they are not. The sign is  what is because it is not anything else, that is, all the possible other signs our language could ascribe to it.

Problems of Saussure’s include the account for the constant change in language and understanding how we combine words into sentences. The process of sentence formation seems like a great mystery to him. Norman N. Holland commented that Saussure Built his linguistics on the unit of the word. One part of Chumsky’s 1957 revolution in linguistics was to change that unit of analysis to the sentence. He made a demand that grammar should be able generate all and only the well-formed sentences of a language. Saussure does not come close to this[1]. Saussure’s idea of a sentence is left without an explanation.

For Wittgenstein there is no difficulty whether the subject understands the meaning of the word. Communication does not refer to mental events and individual conceptions of words is not a question. Locke uses the term ‘idea’ quite liberally throughout his works. He argues that words come to be made use of by men, as the signs of their ideas….a word is made arbitrarily that mark of such an idea. It is unclear what Locke’s discussion of language is actually about. The traditional view is that Locke’s theory of signification is a theory of linguistic meaning. He discusses the signification of words. An idea is a sign or representation. E.J. Ashworth challenged this on the grounds that Locke uses ‘signify’ in the same way as late 16th and early 17th century scholastics used ‘significare’ and that ‘significare’ strictly speaking are not about linguistic meaning. Ashworth goes on to say that signification is a species of representation and that, on Locke’s view, words can represent objects, not just ideas. Locke was pessimistic of human capacity to communicate which accounts for his imperfect view of language[2]. Locke reflects the view that how human beings classify objects rests solely on a natural and objective classification that is independent of the minds activity. For Locke, human language plays a central role in our thinking about classes or kinds. This view still uses internal constructs to explain communication. Wittgenstein protests that so long as the subject hears the word and understands to what it refers to, communication has been successful. The Lockean argument is solved and concluded, and nothing further can be demanded on human understanding in simple linguistic instances.

Regarding sensations and their privacy, it seems that only the subject in pain can know if it is truly pain that they experience, and another person deduces that it is pain that is being observed. Then the problem arises that one might hide feelings of pain. Os tensive definition can be completely disregarded. The only thing that seems to be certain is that pain can be perceived. The communication of this must not be mystified. Language misleads us. We can not know we are in pain. We are in pain. “It makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself”[3]. Wittgenstein thought that using ordinary language with accurate descriptors was the best way to communicate effectively. Locke rejects the view that how human being classify objects rests solely on a natural and objective classification that is independent of the mind’s activity. Although language is not structured the way Saussure proposed, he remains one of the most influential and significant contributors to the study of semiotics.

Philosophy affects the communicative methods; different philosophical approaches provide different ways of examining the conditions for and consequences of the complex processes of human communication. Regardless of personal preferences of different theories, we cannot deny that each of the theorists discussed have made an important contribution to the analytic description of human communication and language.


[1] Norman N. Holland, 1998. The trouble(s) with Lacan. Retrieved 04/04/08 from http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/nnh/lacan.htm

[2] Losonsky, Michael, 2007. Language, Meaning and Mind in Locke’s Essay. Chapter 10. Retrieved 05/04/08. http://lamar.colostate.edu/~losonsky/CCLE_Chap-10_Losonsky.pdf

[3] Kenny, A. 1994. The Wittgenstein Reader. Pp 142.

 

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After correcting 30 assignments or so, I need a forum to vent my frustration of undergraduate students. Apart from the special few who can actually articulate themselves, there seems to be general mistakes being made across the board.

This may be a result of many students never receving writing feedback from assignments, perhaps many of them never have the opportunity to reflect on how they are coming across. In any case this post os all about the general traps that most students fall into when writing an assignment. Apart from simply learning how to write clearly, there are many things that all students should be informed of.

So here you go:

  • Formatting –1.5 or double spaced. It becomes imposible to read unless you present your work clearly. This type of spacing in general across the board and students are told from the very start of their term as a third-level student
  • Stick to one style (or a similar style) of formatting e.g. labelling section, margins and spacing paragraphs. Having paragrahs 1cm from the edge of the paper in one section and 3cm in the next is just not acceptable. Take pride in what you present
  • Space out sections adequately. By adequately, I mean make sure that all sections are clearly presented and not on top of each other
  • Label sections clearly – for the love of God!
  • In-text citation is generally done incorrectly. See academic handbook for the specifics on your college’s referencing system. APA is generally straighforward.

Incorrect: Jones, as cited in Martin 1995; Jones 1992 as Martin discusses; or indeed mentioning Jones (1992) without any reference to Martin (the cited source), and NOT including Jones in the reference section… you know this sticks out like a sore thumb and feels like a knife in the eye for each time ot is done.

Correct: Jones (1992, as cited in Martin 1995)…

  • Too much information put into single paragraphs. This is done cnsistently. Try to elaborate on ONE point perparagraph. Having said that, one and two sentence paragraphs are generally unacceptable
  • Sentences not logically following on from each other… please read what you write
  • Phrasing an issue for some; try to use clear and short sentences
  • Use  of informal language and personal pronouns e.g. use of ‘I’ and ‘my’ . This should NEVER appear in an academic essay/assignment
  • Use of subjective/dramatic adjectives. I don’t care if it’s REALLY RADICAL. I’ll make my mind up on that, thank you…
  • Important statements being made without academic support.
  • Topical issues – use of current topics such as political posters and current advertisements without references or academic support
  • Concluding in one sentence/one sentence paragraphs. You should be shot.

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So this is part two of the discussion on communication and the mind… might as well just jump into it as I couldn’t be bothered writing a second introduction (this is part two, refer to part one for general introduction to the topic). It’s probably worth noting that I’m quite busy writing my thesis at the moment so it may be a while before I finish writing up on this topic. I may just bite the bullet and finish it tomorrow morning though – I just need to articulate my notes but words seem to be failing me! So on that note:

The Cartesian heritage of the nature of communication goes that one can not know other minds as well as their own thoughts and ability to understand. For Descartes, communication started with access to one’s own cogito. This view is egocentric. It is comparable with Locke’s ‘Privacy of the Mental’ from which most hostility of Locke’s arises. He states in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that ‘words in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing, but the ideas of the mind of him that uses them.’ This view that there is an internal entity to which communication is developed from was popular pre-Wittgenstein’s work on language and the mind.

For Locke, the speaker produces an external word representing his or her idea to which the word refers to. The listener, on hearingthe word, derives understanding. It is the private experiences of the communicators that allow communication and meaning to arise. Although this solipsistic view tries to explain the complexity of communication, it mystifies the entire subject further. The nomenclatural nature of this view has given was to intense debate. As Roy Harris discusses, the ‘nomenclaturist’ assumes that words have something to which it refers to, and this ‘something’ is its meaning. This system works for words such as ‘red’ or ‘table’, where identification of the objects fit the case. Wittgenstein would argue here that this fits the case as it relates to a communication situation which does not place complex demands on language.

In part 3 I discuss Saussure’s contemporary version of communication processes which does not seem to arise for Wittgenstein. I also conclude on some of the issues for communication and the mind and put this piece to rest! It’s been a long day and I’m glad I’m still able to get around to writing for myself!

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